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Abstract :
This paper is an answer to the first part of Adrian Kent's One World versus Many : the Inadequacy  
of Everettian Accounts of Evolution, Probability, and Scientific Confirmation.  We take issue with 
Kent's  arguments against  many-world interpretations of quantum mechanics.  We argue that  his 
reasons for preferring single-world interpretations are logically flawed and that his proposed single-
world alternative to probability theory suffers from conceptual problems. We use a few thought-
experiments which show that the problems he raises for probabilities in multiverses also apply in a 
single universe.
Prologue
The publication of Everett’s doctoral thesis has led to a variety of debates, both in physics and the 
philosophy  of  physics,  debates  which  focus  on  whether  or  not  one  can  actually  make  sense  of 
Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics. Among other problems, single-universe proponents 
challenge many-worlders to pinpoint the meaning of probabilities within multiverses. This is a pressing 
concern  for  Everettians  because  of  the  fundamental  role  played  by  probabilities  and  statistics  in 
quantum mechanics. Simply put, to choose an interpretation of quantum mechanics unable to provide a 
straightforward account of the nature of probabilities is like to throw away the ladder one has just 
climbed from. This would make Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics both more opaque 
and complex than their single-world counterparts and would provide a good reason to reject many-
world interpretations as a whole.
In  One  World  versus  Many,  Adrian  Kent  voices  a  variety  of  problems  for  Everettian 
interpretations which roughly center along those lines. Thus, he says: “My aim here is not to advocate a 
specific one-world version or variant of quantum theory, or to assess the current state of the art, but 
rather to compare and contrast one-world and many-world accounts of probability.”1 This is precisely 
the point we wish to discuss. We will not engage with the answers Kent provides to Greaves-Myrvold’s 
and David Wallace’s account of probabilities in terms of decision theory.  Our whole concern is to 
refute the arguments Kent puts forward in support of the following claim : “No known version of the  
theory (unadorned by extra  ad hoc postulates)  can account for the appearance of probabilities  and 
explain why the theory it was meant to replace, Copenhagen quantum theory, appears to be confirmed, 
or more generally why our evolutionary history appears to be Born-rule typical.”2 Kent thinks this 
problem is specific to many-world interpretations of quantum mechanics and can be avoided by their 
single-world counterparts through an alternative to the standard theory of probability. We think that 
Kent’s substitution to probability theory faces important problems and that the worry he expresses 
about specific many-world interpretations of quantum mechanics are also problematic for single-world 
interpretations. We intend to show this through a series of rather mischievous thought-experiments.
1Kent, Adrian, « One World versus Many : the Inadequacy of Everettian Accounts of Evolution, Probability, and Scientific 
Confirmation », p. 3. Available online at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0905/0905.0624v2.pdf. 
2One World versus Many, p. 1.
Act 1 - Guildenstern and Rosencrantz
Consider a simplified version of Kent's proposed cases.3 Imagine a God—call him Tom Stoppard—
ruling over a set of universes. Stoppard’s universes are very simple. Their whole content is composed 
of an infinitely long blackboard, on which a string of cells are filled by single 0s or 1s, much like a  
Turing machine’s tape. At some point, the numbers stop, however, as empty cells waiting to be filled  
extend into the distance. Besides this humongous blackboard, a duo of inhabitants—Guildenstern and 
Rosencrantz—quarrel about the meaning of the blackboard and a few other existential questions. The 
protocol through which Stoppard generates these numbers, elegantly named Duplicate, Numerate and 
Destroy, is straightforward. Every time He destroys some universe, two copies are made. In one copy, a 
0 fills the first cell left empty on the Infinite Blackboard’s tape. In the other universe, a 1 fills the same 
spot.  This  is  the  procedure  Stoppard  has  followed  religiously  from  the  destruction  of  the  first, 
primordial  universe.  The  original  facsimilation  of  this  primordial  universe  in  which  the  Infinite 
Blackboard was totally empty became the original step of Duplicate, Numerate and Destroy. This act 
marked the beginning of The Age of Perplexity.
Although adequately perplexed, Guildenstern and Rosencrantz are aware the entity known as 
Tom Stoppard destroys all universes every day and immediately creates a certain number of copies for 
each universe destroyed. How many? They don’t know. They do know, however, that every time a 
universe is destroyed and then reduplicated, a new number—either 0 or 1—fills the next empty cell on 
each of the new universes’ Infinite Blackboard. They have no access to the rest of the Lord’s divine 
procedure. In every universe, copies of Guildenstern and Rosencrantz wonder what to think of this 
mess.  Puzzled  by  their  own predicament,  they  ask  whether  Guildenstern  dies  everytime  Stoppard 
deletes the cosmos, whether Rosencrantz merely is the sum of his copies across the multiverse,  or 
whether their immaterial souls fly from destroyed universes into freshly created one, animating their 
bodies and preserving their identities over time.
After  some  time,  however,  our  philosophically  bent  inhabitants  agree  on  turning  to  more 
pragmatic  questions  and  try  to  infer  Stoppard’s  real  protocol.  Given  their  lack  of  information, 
Guildenstern and Rosencrantz assume He creates a number n of universes with a 0, and a number m of 
universes with a 1 every day. They ask: “What is the proportion p of universes created with a 0 (p = 
n/n+m) and what is the proportion q of universes created with a 1, (q= 1-p)?” How could they answer 
this question? Assume they turn to frequentism. In such a scenario, the Guildensterns and Rosencrantzs 
of Stoppard’s multiverse will estimate the proportion of universes created with a 0 as the proportion of 
0s inscribed so far on their own blackboard. They will revise this estimation every day, whenever a 
new number appears on the Turing-like tape.
When Guildenstern and Rosencrantz ask what proportion of universes have a certain property, 
this defines a probability measure in the traditional mathematical sense of the term. This probability 
measure satisfies Kolmogorov’s axioms. First, the proportion of the totality of universes is one, no set 
of universes has a negative proportion, and the total proportion of two disjoint sets of universes is equal 
to  the  sum of  the  proportion  of  both  sets.  Thus,  all  mathematical  proofs  relying  on statistics  and 
probabilities  apply to this toy model.  We are justified to say this probability space will  reflect the 
experience of Guildenstern and Rosencrantz for reasons of symmetry: all universes are created equal, 
they differ only by the addition of either a 0 or a 1 on the blackboard. These numbers have no further  
metaphysical  or  physical  significance.  However,  some  people  might  think  that  a  mathematical 
probability does not necessarily translate into a more intuitive, subjective sense of probability. This is 
not a problem for us. More will be said about this later. 
3In Kent’s original article, simulated beings are pressing a red button to create new universes. We modified this in our 
presentation because then  some branches might simply never happen:  the simulated beings might decide never to press to 
red button given certain circumstances. And then Tom Stoppard would not be in the complete control of the situation.
In such a situation, frequentism is a completely reasonable strategy. In the absence of further 
information about Tom Stoppard’s motives,  habits or beliefs,  Guildenstern and Rosencrantz cannot 
justify probabilistic  a prioris about Stoppard’s protocol. The Lord is, after all, a transcendent being. 
Because His  nature  cannot  be inferred  from the  inhabitants’  surroundings,  all  talk  of  probabilistic 
weights not entirely derived from observed frequencies is irrelevant to Guildenstern and Rosencrantz’s 
concerns. Without a reliable form of Divine Revelation coming down from the sky, all the relevant 
information accessible to our inhabitants stands on the Infinite Blackboard. Nothing else matters. We 
say this  in  reply to  Kent’s  discussion of  branch weight.  In  some of  Kent’s  toy universes,  various 
weights are attached to branches. Transposed in our theatrical scenario, Kent’s weights should work 
like this. Imagine Guildenstern and Rosencrantz find a strange bottle in which they find the following 
message: n=35, m=65. Without any a priori about the message’s truth, Guildenstern and Rosencrantz 
cannot assume it constitutes an important piece of information. Either the message gives the real values 
of  m and n, or it does not. If it does, its accuracy of the value of  p and q can be determined by any 
typical  Guildenstern  simply  looking at  the  Infinite  Blackboard.  If  it  doesn’t,  again,  looking at  the 
Infinite Blackboard does the trick. The message has no informational value. Given the circumstances, 
frequentism is the best strategy.
Nonetheless,  some problems remain unavoidable.  In a very small  minority of universes,  an 
atypical sequence stands on the Infinite Blackboard, that is, a sequence unrepresentative of the rules 
followed by Tom Stoppard. In those universes, our protagonists find themselves in a predicament very 
similar to the situation described in the real Tom Stoppard’s play Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are  
Dead, in which consecutive coin-tosses yield 92 heads in a row. This is a highly atypical sequence, one 
which—although logically possible—is unrepresentative of the probabilistic rules of coin-tossing. If 
the real Tom Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and Guildenstern were to generalize their obtained statistics into a 
probabilistic theory about coin-tossing, they would be widely off the mark. To adopt frequentism is to 
assume that the sequence initially given is a typical sequence and that, as the number of trials increases, 
the sequence obtained will be more and more representative of the real probability underlying trial 
results.
 Problematically,  frequentism  never  avoids  the  logical  possibility  of  very  long,  persistent 
atypical sequences. Given a large enough number of universes within a multiverse, there will be some 
atypical  universes  in  which  data  leads  to  erroneous  conclusions.  In  other  words,  by  adopting 
frequentism, some duos of Guildensterns and Rosencrantzs will be led astray in their quest for the 
Divine Protocol.  Kent  rightly argues  there  is  no way to  know if  one's  own universe is  typical  or 
atypical. However, he also thinks this is a crippling argument against Everettian quantum mechanics. 
We think, on the other hand, that this is rather a fundamental limitation of probabilities and statistics. 
Such worries are in no way more crippling for many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics than 
for their single-world counterparts. Or indeed, even for the simplest coin-toss experiment. This problem 
merely is the problem of induction, a problem which, although worrisome in theory,  is perpetually 
overcome in practice.
Act 2 - Guildenstern and Rosencrantz in Space
Imagine a different scenario, taking place in a single, gigantic universe. This universe contains 21 000 000 
000 planets, all inhabited by copies of our Shakespearian duo4. Each planet is endowed with a colossal 
but finite blackboard with a tape-like inscriptions of 0s and 1s. Each day, a new cell is filled on the tape 
while all previous inscriptions remain the same. During the first day of this single universe’s existence, 
exactly half the planets obtain a 0 and the remainder obtains a 1. The second day, exactly a quarter of 
the planets harbour each possible two-bit sequence and so on. Guildenstern and Rosencrantz witness 
this process until, after a billion days, new digits stop appearing on each planet’s blackboard. Alarmed 
and  puzzled  by  such  an  unexpected  event—which  they  agree  on  calling  the  Day  of  Ultimate  
Computation—Guildenstern and Rosencrantz are persuaded their own salvation depends on producing 
Stoppard’s protocol in front of the Great Ruler himself.
Imagine that Guildenstern, terrified by the prospects of failure, laments in despair: “Useless! 
Why inquire about any Supreme Being’s whim when this Divine Withholder relishes at the sight of his 
own creatures’  frenzied  efforts  to conform to some undisclosed law? Malice is  this  sole Creator’s 
motive, and I would wage against there being any Divine Protocol at all. No law explains or gives rise 
to these cursed numbers! Only blind chance and pure arbitrariness! That, and the ecstasy enjoyed by He 
who  cherishes  the  sight  of  fools  staking  their  lives  on  the  existence  of  such  fictions!”  And  so,  
convinced the emergence of digits on the blackboard is a pure random event, simply designed to cause 
them additional  torment  before  their  final  demise,  Guildenstern  buries  his  face  in  his  hands  and 
abandons all hope.
A more resolute Rosencrantz could easily reply : “You call Divine Law a fiction because you 
perceive malice in our Lord’s mysterious silence. But have you thought of the sheer absurdity of your 
words? An event foreign to cosmic order and devoid of origin! You would like to call such a bastard  
child of chance “Random”. But what exact thought corresponds to this lame pseudonym? Can you 
imagine a single process caused by this snot-faced brat? Is causation even within reach of his greasy 
hands? No, my friend, when you claim no protocol explains what our eyes have seen since this planet 
came into being, I can only think the despair in your heart dictates the capitulation of your mind.”
As  Rosencrantz  steps  down  from  his  soapbox,  Guildenstern  would  probably  realize  this 
alternative really is enigmatic. How can we wrap our heads around true randomness, understood as a 
real feature of the world and not merely a by-product of ignorance? More importantly, what could one 
possibly achieve with such a presupposition? From a pragmatic point of view, to assume data stems  
from a completely and pervasively random source is simply to assume there is nothing to be learned or 
predicted about a given phenomenon. Such a principle is sterile. Imagine Guildenstern realizes the error 
of his ways and agrees with Rosencrantz to figure out Stoppard’s protocol. To what tool do they turn? 
Standard probability theory and frequentist statistics once again. Much like in our multiverse case, a 
few planets  harbour  atypical  sequences,  while  the  overwhelming  majority  of  planets  have  typical 
sequences of 0s and 1s. As before, the inhabitants of typical planets possess the best understanding of 
what is going on elsewhere and the greatest ability to understand their own future. They come very near 
to Tom Stoppard’s real protocol. Also, in most planets where inhabitants observe atypical results, this  
atypicality is short-lived and dissolves over time.
This case is rigorously analogous to the previous one, even if it  takes place within a single 
universe.  This  shows  that  Kent’s  problem,  which  focuses  on  the  impossibility  of  knowing  with 
certainty whether one’s data is representative of the laws of the universe, is not a problem specific to 
Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics, but applies just as well to single universe theories. In 
single universes just as in multiverses, no one can be absolutely certain one’s results are typical. But 
4We challenge any reader who thinks such a number of planets within in a single universe is impossible to provide a 
deductive proof for this claim. 
what else is there to do, except assume typicality and wait for further results? Give up the idea that the  
past events should somehow inform us about the future? This seems to be the only alternative, one 
which is unacceptable in theory, and inefficient in practice. Let’s not follow Guildenstern’s footsteps 
here and bury our head in our hands in desperation.5
Exeunt—Biased Coin Reinterpretation and Deductive Falsifiability
The lack of a mechanism deductively justifying theory refutation on the basis of observation is one of 
the  most  persistent  problems  addressed  in  Kent’s  article.  While  traditional  statistical  tools  allow 
inhabitants of typical planets and universes to tentatively “refute” and “prove” theories, they are useless 
to the very small minority living in weird universes or planets. These standard tools will systematically 
lead them to “prove” and “refute” the wrong theories. And since there is no way of knowing whether 
we live in an atypical branch of Stoppard’s multiverse, Kent thinks this impossibility invalidates the 
use of these traditional tools in the context of many-worlds theories of quantum mechanics. In other 
words, multiverse inhabitants would not be justified to infer probabilities out of statistics. If true, this  
would be a major problem for Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics. Kent also thinks this 
problem can  be  sidestepped  in  single-world  interpretations  and  argues  for  the  superiority  of  such 
interpretations on account of this difficulty. He defends this thesis by proposing a model which—he 
thinks—would make such purely deductive refutation possible in single universes. We will argue he is 
mistaken on both points. Kent says: 
The theory PT [a given probabilistic theory] is thus not  logically refuted by the 
outcome S [an extremely improbable event according to the theory]. In practice we 
would reject it—but, without a fundamentally satisfactory account of probability, it 
is hard to give a completely satisfactory justification for doing so. In our alternative 
account, however, no such problem arises. [...] On this view of scientific accounts 
of apparently random data, that’s the best one can hope for: generically, no single 
clearly optimal theory will emerge. However, we can hypothesize that theories of 
roughly  this  length  are  essentially  best  possible—i.e.  that  the  string  cannot  be 
compressed to significantly shorter than H(p)N bits—and this hypothesis is testable  
and falsifiable.6
Kent claims to  provide an account  of probability which yields  not mere inductive  justification  for 
rejecting a given probabilistic theory on account of conflictual observations, but a full-blown deductive 
one. This is what he means by a logically refutable theory. The endeavour is far from trivial. If Kent 
succeeds,  not only would he solve an age-old philosophical  problem, but he would also provide a 
theoretical  reason to  prefer single-world interpretations  of quantum mechanics  to their  multi-world 
counterparts. We think, however, that Kent’s account fails to meet these standards.
Let us follow Kent for a moment. Imagine a source producing strings of 0s and 1s, strings that 
look like the results of fair coin tosses. This process is apparently random, although possibly pseudo-
random. We observe a large string of 0s and 1s. Using traditional means, even if we observe 1 % of 0s 
and 99% of 1s, we can never deductively refute the hypothesis that the coin is fair. This will remain 
true independently of string length. Standard probability theory allows for the possibility that a fair coin 
could produce these results. Thus, as Kent says, we might have practical justification for rejecting the 
5The proportion of planets with a certain property defines a probability space just like in our previous example. The same 
question still applies if we ask whether this mathematical space translates into an intuitive notion of physical probability.
6One World versus Many, p. 5-6.
hypothesis  that the source behaves like a fair  coin,  but this  justification falls  short of the absolute 
certainty that would provide deductive justification.
Kent proposes a rather complex alternative. He builds an account of theory refutation on the 
basis of Shannon entropy.  However,  Shannon entropy is  not what warrants his claim to deductive 
falsifiability. Therefore, we refer any reader interested in this point to Kent’s own article.7 We will stick 
to the essential feature of Kent’s account of deductive falsifiability. Kent starts by considering a very 
large number of hypotheses (almost every possible one, rejecting a few for criterions of simplicity and 
elegance). For any single theory according to Kent’s account, some sequences of events lie within the 
predictive scope of a theory. When an observed event does not figure within that predictive scope, the 
theory is logically refuted. The crucial step of Kent’s alternative comes when he excludes some very 
improbable events, but events which are nonetheless still possible according to standard probability 
theory:
Again,  [Kent’s]  theories  reproduce  deterministically  predictions  that  the  standard 
probabilistic  theory says  hold with probability  very close (but not equal)  to one. 
They exclude some very low probability events which would, if realised, in practice 
persuade almost everyone that the probabilistic theory was wrong, even though their 
occurrence is logically consistent with the theory.8
This  way  of  treating  very  improbable  but  not  altogether  impossible  events  might  indeed  be  an 
advantage  proper  to  single-world  theories  of  quantum mechanics.  Since  according  to  multi-world 
theories, every branch is actual, to disregard weird branches is not merely to make abstraction of some 
rare possibility,  but  to actually  fail  to take into account  something real.  However,  even if  making 
abstraction of very weird, improbable events seems to be the prerogative of the single-world theorist, 
we think such an abstraction is unwarranted and leads to important errors. 
Where does this desire for deductive falsifiability come from? From Popper’s philosophy of 
science. If science works from induction, there is no deductive basis for accepting theories because no 
inductive argument ever attains deductive certainty. Where does scientific validity come from if theory 
confirmation has no logical basis? Popper’s answer to this problem was that science does not prove 
theories through induction, but rather falsifies them through deduction. A theory’s scientificity resides 
in its falsifiability. Accordingly, what made Newtonian mechanics scientific is the fact that this theory 
could  be  refuted.  Indeed,  it  has.  Relativity  theory  now stands  in  its  place.  This  case  provides  an 
illustration  of  Popper’s  understanding  of  scientific  progress:  a  single  experiment  can  falsify  a 
deterministic physical theory:
The acceptance by science of a law or of a theory is tentative only; which is to say 
that all laws and theories are conjectures, or tentative hypotheses (a position which I 
have sometimes called 'hypotheticism')  […] So long as a theory stands up to the 
severest tests we can design, it is accepted; if it does not, it is rejected. But it is never  
inferred, in any sense, from the empirical evidence. There is neither a psychological 
nor a logical induction. Only the falsity of the theory can be inferred from empirical 
evidence and this inference is a purely deductive one.9
But not so fast. We believe this conception of scientific progress is simplistic. Although it looks good 
to the logician,  no empirical scientist  ever employs  it.  Suppose a coyote drops an anvil  off a cliff 
(perhaps aiming for some fast-moving bird). Suppose the anvil immediately flies up only to come down 
7One World versus Many, p. 4-6.
8One World versus Many, p. 6.
9Karl Popper, “The Problem of Induction,” in Popper Selections, ed. David Miller, Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 102. 
smashing on the poor, hungry and puzzled animal.  Is universal gravity thereby falsified? No. This 
would be reckless science. No one can assume that experimental settings have ruled out all external  
factors. There could be a huge, powerful magnet counterbalancing gravitational force somewhere in the 
sky. Two different problems can be found with such an account. On the one hand, Popper’s theory only 
applies  to  toy  models  of  deterministic  sciences  in  which  all  factors  are  under  precise  control.  
Remember  that  deductive  entailment  supposes  logical  certainty.  To claim a single experiment  can 
invalidate a whole theory is to claim that it is logically impossible that something was wrong with  
one’s experimental protocol or observations. No scientist can ever claim his protocol to be that smooth
—never with this degree of certainty. Popper did recognize this fact, and merely proposed deductive 
falsifiability as a criterion of what is empirical or not. In other words, for any possible empirical theory,  
there  should  in  principle  be  some  observation  which  would  deductively  invalidate  the  theory.  In 
practice,  however,  things  are  more  complex.  At  the time when this  article  was being written,  the 
scientific community was shocked by the apparent discovery that neutrinos can travel faster than the 
speed of light.  This discovery could refute Einstein’s relativity theory.  However,  scientists  are still 
struggling  to  find  out  what  really  happened.  This  shows that,  in  practice,  a  single  or  even a  few 
observations do not lead naturally to deductive refutation. How many experiments do we need? With 
this question, we come back face to face with our old friend induction. Falsifiability—in practice and 
within deterministic sciences—does not work deductively but inductively.
A second  problem exists  with  Popper’s  account.  There  are  sciences  which  are  not  overtly 
deterministic,  either  because  of  pervasive  pseudo-randomness  or  true  randomness.  Pharmaceutical 
science in particular deals with evidence that is irremediably statistical in nature. No single event will 
ever count as deductive refutation in pharmaceutical science because its predictions make room for 
weird, atypical events. Drugs do not always have the same effects on everyone. The same is true for 
quantum  mechanics,  and  perhaps  even  more  so  because  there  are  good  reasons  to  think  that 
pharmaceutical science is based on merely apparent randomness, while the randomness of quantum 
mechanics is of a very different and elusive nature.
Therefore,  according to this  criterion of what is  scientific  or not—deductive  falsifiability—
pharmaceutical science would not qualify as an empirical science because no single observation could 
deductively refute our theories about the effectiveness of a given drug. Not even in principle. The same 
applies  to  quantum mechanics.  The tools  of  deductive  logic which are the hallmark  of theoretical 
computer  science and mathematics are certainly useful in empirical science.  However, they do not 
suffice in establishing the scientific validity of some theory. Falsifiability works inductively in practice. 
Act 3 - Guildenstern and Rosencrantz’s Great Falsification
We propose a new thought experiment in order to engage Kent’s theory on his own grounds. Imagine 
copies of Guildenstern and Rosencrantz trapped in space, once again. Our sympathetic duo lives, as 
before, in a single universe with an enormous amount of planets. In an act of Divine Providence, Tom 
endows all of them with rigorously identical quantum automatons.10 These automatons are identical 
down  to  the  atomic  level.  Suppose  they  interpret  this  quantum  analytical  engine’s  surnatural 
appearance as a sign of some divine command—Thou shall determine the divine automaton’s fairness
—where fairness is defined as a 50% chance of obtaining 0 and a 50% chance of obtaining a 1.  
Furthermore,  suppose our  rather  paranoid inhabitants  believe  a  wrong answer will  trigger  the  All-
Branching Apocalypse—a cataclysmic scenario in which the universe would divide in four branches. In 
10For the few readers not familiar with forbidden engineering and quantum alchemy, a quantum automaton can be thought 
of as a steam-powered device with a copper lever, and an extremely large Turing tape, as in our previous single universe 
example. Each time the copper lever is pulled, either a 0 or a 1 will mysteriously appear on the tape, on the rightmost empty 
cell. It was invented by Lady Quanta Lovelace in an alternate universe.
each of these branches, copies of Guildenstern and Rosencrantz would be hunted down by one of the 
four horsemen of the Apocalypse. In fact, no such thing  will happen. The universe will not and cannot  
branch, and the horsemen of the Apocalypse are mere fairy tales. However, because of this belief, an 
infallible method would cause Guildenstern and Rosencrantz great relief. 
Suppose  our  Celestial  Dramatist  ensures  the  statistics  obtained  on  all  tapes  are  rigorously 
identical  to  the  statistics  in  our  previous  single  universe  thought-experiment.  After  pulling  the 
automatons’ copper lever a few million times, a great majority of Guildensterns and Rosencrantzs will 
come to the conclusion that the quantum automaton is fair. However, given the formidable amount of 
planets  where  trials  are  conducted,  weird  results  are  bound  to  happen.  As  the  inhabitants  of  this 
universe are aware of the number of planets and the number of people like them living on these planets, 
imagine the following dialogue occurs on a planet where the ratio of 0s to 1s is 9:1.
***
Guildenstern: “Alas, my poor Rosencrantz! How ardent is my wish for indubitable truth! How 
miserably do our theories squirm in the face of absolute certainty! Unavoidably, someone, somewhere 
across this universe is bound to fail through our very method. This poor soul will fail without stumble  
or miscalculation, only through the brute imperfections of chance!”
Rosencrantz: “Take hope, Guildenstern! I have found an arcane procedure invented by some 
quantum  wizard,  a  procedure  yielding  infallible  theory-refutation.  Because  only  two  hypotheses 
compete  for  our  approbation,  deductive  falsification  here means  indubitable  truth.  Let  us  discover 
whether the Sacred Automaton is reliable or another of His wicked tricks! Although the formula is 
quite  complex,  the  main  steps  are  straightforward:  1)  assume typicality  and 2)  exclude  extremely 
improbable events as logically impossible.”
Guildenstern: “My dear Rosencrantz! Redemption is ours if this quantum charm is as potent as 
its brewer claims. You and I will never run eternal circles in front of horse-riding Death or saddled 
Sickness. How does this quantum wizard prove the logical impossibility of the extremely improbable?”
Rosencrantz: “Nowhere. Assuming does the trick. ‘Tis sufficient.”
Guildenstern: “Surely, this will not do. Magic should be more elaborate.”
Rosencrantz: “Guildenstern, redemption is handed to you on a plate. Can your stomach really 
be bothered by something so desirable? Disgust is most inappropriate in such circumstances.”
Guildenstern:  “Think,  my friend.  This  arcane procedure only grants  us redemption  through 
sound assumptions. How can this wizard turn the merely improbable into the logically impossible? 
Such incantations are unheard of. We are warranted to assume we live on typical ground and lead 
typical lives. We are justified in thinking the extremely improbable will not happen here. Not to us. But 
never with absolute certainty. Why assume logic allows special treatment in this part of the universe? 
This land, our lives, these things mean nothing to logic’s iron hand.”
Rosencrantz: “Guildenstern, I hear your words, but I fear they are parting words. I will use the 
quantum wizard’s formula. I have no use for anything less than absolute certainty.  Do according to 
your wish, I will stand by my resolution.”
***
Imagine that, once Guildenstern and Rosencrantz have agreed to disagree, Tom sends a steam-powered 
space zeppelin (expertly piloted by an archangel) which allows them to visit every other planet (given 
astronomical time) and verify the numbers given by other automatons. In doing so, they obtain proof 
their own planet was atypical and that the quantum automaton was, in fact, fair. They also observe that,  
on typical planets, the merely inductive method followed by Guildenstern led their copies to answer 
correctly.  This  comes  as  a  shock  to  Rosencrantz,  who was  convinced  being  wrong was  logically 
impossible.  To be sure, Guildenstern is also surprised to find out he lived in a profoundly atypical  
world, but his method allowed such a possibility. Since the automatons are identical down to the atomic 
level, Rosencrantz is then forced to either reject the validity of his own procedure—which was also 
Kent’s—or deny that atomic level  symmetry is  a sufficient  reason to believe the automatons were 
strictly equivalent.
This is an important problem for Kent’s account of theory-refutation. Either Kent needs to say 
the theory selected by his theory-refutation procedure is only applicable to the particular source which 
yielded his original data, or these results can be extended to relevantly similar sources. In the former 
case, Kent’s proposal would not amount to anything remotely scientific in nature. If one refuses to 
derive predictions about relevantly similar sources, objects or events, then one refuses to subject one’s 
theory both to the main test of scientific validity and the main practical use science has in general. This 
would be tantamount to saying, in the context of quantum mechanics, that a given theory does not say 
anything about equivalent  particles,  but only about  this particle.  This is obviously problematic.  To 
refuse to make predictions about similar sources, objects or events is to refuse to engage in science 
altogether. 
If  Kent  is  willing  to  use  his  deductively  obtained  theory  to  provide  predictions  about  the 
behaviour of relevantly similar sources, objects or events, then he will have to recognize that sources 
may be equivalent without giving remotely similar data. Similar particles can yield radically different 
results given enough trials but this is no foolproof reason to think our generalizations do not apply to all 
these particles. To recognize that fact is to recognize that no process of deductive refutation can be 
extrapolated from a single source and then applied to further observations. This is clearly in conflict 
with Kent’s proposal. He says: “Conversely, the theory logically (not merely with high probability) 
implies that we will see no consistent regularities in our experimental data that would, on the usual 
account, be highly improbable.”11 This, we argue, is incompatible with the basic scientific task which 
consists in providing predictions about the behaviour of relevantly similar objects. Even if, after a very 
large number of trials on a given type of particle,  we have never observed a single particle which 
behaved as atypically as one currently under observation, we cannot be justified in thinking one could 
deductively refute the hypothesis that this particle is like all previous ones. With enough trials, even 
equivalent  sources  are  bound  to  exhibit  great  variation.  This  is  a  burden  inherent  to  scientific  
explanation.
One final point: Kent’s proposed procedure is non-standard in that it starts with almost every 
possible  hypothesis  about  the structure  of  data  (almost,  because some are excluded for reasons of 
simplicity  and  elegance).  Accordingly,  even  very  large  amounts  of  data  will  never  succeed  in 
narrowing  down  this  melting-pot  of  hypotheses  into  a  single,  usable  theory.  Think  about  poor 
Guildenstern  and Rosencrantz,  which are concerned about their  own future and the future of their 
universe. How can they predict anything about their own future given millions of theories? Science is a  
practical endeavour which needs a single or a few models of the world in order to make predictions. 
Having a few millions theories is practically similar to having no hypothesis at all. If Kent’s account of 
theory-refutation does not select in the end one or two theories which are considered the right ones, our 
human protagonist will have to do it anyway for practical reasons.
11One World versus Many, p. 6.
Epilogue
Progress in philosophy is often not about finding final answers but about converging toward the real 
nature  of  some  enduring  problem.  Philosophical  problems  about  quantum  mechanics  make  no 
exception. In our theatrical universes final answers are Tom Stoppard’s privilege. They are inaccessible 
to  those who inhabit  His  tales.  Tom’s  creatures  can  only approximate.  They can  never  know the 
Celestial Playwright’s true intentions. This process of approximation, however, is remarkably reliable. 
In reply to Kent, we think we have shown how atypicality is not a problem specific to many-world  
interpretations of quantum mechanics. This problem merely is the problem of induction, an enduring 
problem for the foundations of science which cannot be superseded in theory but can be overlooked in 
practice. Science cannot be reduced to logic and deduction will never replace induction. If science was 
reducible to logic, no prediction could ever be made. Statistics and probability are unavoidable tools in 
science.
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